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SECURITIES LEGISLATION-FRAUD OF CoRPORAUON OFFICERS AS VIOLATION 
OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-The plaintiffs brought a stock-
holders' derivative suit in a federal district court, claiming that defendant 
directors had violated section 10 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
19341 and rule X-IOB-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 It 
was alleged that defendants who controlled as majority of the capital stock 
of the Algoma Coal and Coke Co., had purchased for the Algoma Com-
pany stock in two other corporations which they had formed and had ma-
nipulated the affairs of the Algoma Company so that business profits were 
diverted to those other corporations, thereby securing profits to themselves 
at the expense of plaintiff stockholders. On defendants' motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a cause of action arising under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, held, motion granted. The Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 confers on the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction only over 
those actions involving a right of recovery that goes beyond the common 
law rights that could be fully adjudicated and enforced by an appropriate 
148 Stat. L. 881 (1934), 15 U .S.C. (1952) §78j(b). 
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality o~ interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a.material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." SEC Release No. 3230, 
effective May 21, 1942. 
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action in a state court. Beury v. Beury, (D.C. W.Va. 1954) 127 F. Supp. 
786. 
However one may feel about the result in this particular case, the 
proposition for which it stands arises from an error in reasoning which, 
if relied upon, will be unduly restrictive of the scope of rule X-IOB-5 
of the Securities Exchange Commission. The court reasons that since the 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all claims arising under 
the Securities and Exchange Act, and since Congress did not intend that 
act to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over all actions for fraud wherein 
purchases or sales of securities might be involved, rule X-IOB-5 must not 
have been intended to cpver actions for fraud which could have been 
maintained in state courts at common law. However, it does not follow 
from the fact that Congress did not intend to withdraw from the state 
courts all fraud actions involving the purchase or sale of securities that 
it did not intend to withdraw this particular kind of fraud action from 
those courts. Accordingly, the question ought to be whether this particular 
transaction falls within the provisions of rule X-IOB-5 and therefore is 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. In this con-
nection, the pivotal question should be whether the fraud alleged in the 
principal case arose "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.3 
Construing this language in terms of the policy underlying the formula-
tion by the SEC of rule X-IOB-5,4 it appears that the fraud involved in 
the particular case is not of the kind which that rule was intended to 
remedy. The corporation was not injured by the purchase of the shares, 
as such, there being no evidence that it did not get what it paid for. The 
injury to the corporation arose only from the alleged subsequent mismanage-
ment of its affairs by the defendants. Although the purchase of those 
shares might be said to be a part of the general scheme to defraud, the 
primary basis upon which liability is asserted is the violation by the 
defendants of their fiduciary duties as <l:irectors. The court could have 
reached the result it did without restricting the scope of rule X-IOB-5 by 
supporting the rule advanced in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co.5 In that 
case the court dismissed a complaint which alleged that the defendant, 
president of the board of directors, had rejected an offer for a profitable 
merger in order to permit the negotiation of a private sale of his own in-
terests in the corporation at twice the market value. The court held that 
section 10 (b)-pursuant to which rule X-IOB-5 was promulgated-"was 
3 The language of rule X-l0B-5 would include any scheme or device whose object 
is to defraud, so long as it involved use of a "means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce" and was perpetrated "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.'' 
See note 2 supra. 
4 The, rule was intended only to remedy the fact that under the existing Securities 
and Exchange Act no remedy existed for fraud in the purchase of securities by persons 
other than brokers and dealers. In particular, it was aimed at requiring disclosure by 
corporate "insiders" seeking to take advantage of knowledge they possessed by virtue 
of their office. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 810 (1951): ' 
5 (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 461. 
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directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice 
usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at 
fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-IOB-5 
extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.''6 This 
represents a more sound approach to the construction problem than that 
taken in the principal case and accomplishes a result more in keeping with 
what the rule was intended to accomplish.7 
Douglas Peck, S.Ed. 
6 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 461 at 464. 
7 See note 4 supra. Under this view Robinson v. Difford, (D.C. Pa. 1950) 92 F. 
Supp. 145, cited by the court in the principal case as being improperly decided, is clearly 
distinguishable and represents a proper case for the application of rule X-IOB-5. In 
that case, the fraud alleged was the director's action in inducing the minority share-
holders to sell their shares to the directors at a price substantially below the market 
value. There was, therefore, no question but that the fraud was "in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities," the only question being whether §10 (b) applied 
to private transactions. The court properly held that the complaint stated a cause 
of action under §10 (b). 
